In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHIES OF AQUINAS AND AWOLOW0 1 FRANCIS I. 0GUNMODEDE Semlnary of SS. Peter and Paul Ibadan, Nigeria Introduction W:HAT POSSIBLE connection is there between the hought of Aquinas and that of Awolowo? We must first observe a sharp difference in personality and approach to politics between the two men. Obafemi Awolowo ( 1909-87) was a recent Nigerian philosopher and politician whose works on politics include The (...) People's Republic (1968) and Thoughts on the Nigerian Constitution ( 1970), among others.2 St. Thomas, on the other hand, was a medieval Italian priest who, because of his intensive academic pursuits and religious calling, did not engage in practical politics. In fact, it has been said that St. Thomas was the greatest philosopher that ever lived after Plato and Aristotle, but one without a political theory. This opinion is drawn from the fact that he has left no complete work on politics to which we can turn as we do to the Politics of Aristotle or to the Social Contract of Rousseau. Thomas never completed his Commentary on the Politics of Aristotle or his treatise De Regimine Principum (De regno). There is another good reason to say that St. Thomas does not provide his readers with an adequate political doctrine. This is 1 This is an adaptation of an original lecture titled "Elements of St. Thomas's Politics in Awolowo's Social Philosophy" given to mark Aquinas Day at the Dominican Institute of Philosophy, Ibadan, Nigeria on January 28, 1989. 2 For other works and writings by Awolowo, see F. Ogunmodede, Obafemi Awolowo's Socio-Political Philosophy (Rome, 1986), pp. 269-272. 265 266 FRANCIS I. OGUNMODEDE his " essentially theoretical " 3 approach to the study of politics. Aquinas's political reflections did not arise from any practical issue. The impact of philosophy was the determining factor. His views on state and government were part of a philosophical system. The approach of Awolowo to politics is quite different. It is empirical and practical. For, as D'Entreves says, modern man, unlike his medieval counterpart, has " become so entangled in particulars, in the practical side of politics, that it is only with an effort that we can be brought to realize the existence of the more general issues which lie behind our immediate predicament." 4 Nevertheless, one can relate the political thought of both men. History is already filled with cases of scientific discoveries made at the same time by men in different places without any prior knowledge of one another's achievements. For instance, the controversy over the discovery of calculus was resolved by crediting both Newton and Leibniz with the discovery at the same time, each in his own country. Perhaps we can add that fundamental ideas about man and society can be shared, because of their universal nature, by people in different ages, places, and circumstances. This is the basis for the present comparison of Awolowo 's and St. Thomas's socio-political philosophies. This position is favored by the fact that, whichever way one looks at it, both have a political theory, a set of propositions systematically related to one another in such a way and manner that it is meaningful and realistic for us to talk of a "theory." Perhaps the contribution of this paper is to demonstrate that Awolowo and Aquinas do share many basic ideas and concepts about reality, about religion, and especially about polity. This view is supported by the fact that, even though Awolowo wrote no treatise on metaphysics,5 as Aquinas did, he nonetheless built on sound 3 A. P. D'Entreves, Aquinas: Selected Political Writings (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1959), p. viii. 4 Ibid. 5 Unfortunately, Awolowo died before he could write works setting out his metaphysics systematically. But he gave a very long interview to Dr. Makinde of the 0.A.U., Ile-Ife, just before he died. This gives some insight into his AQUINAS AND AWOLOWO 267 fundamental postulates and principles which are metaphysical in nature in his thinking about politics.6 Now, there are many approaches and methods in the study of any political theorist. According to B. J. Dudley, " we can concern ourselves with the sort of assumptions... (shrink)

The case of Elizabeth Bouvia, a handicapped woman who wanted doctors to assist her in dying, reveals that autonomy is insufficient as the sole or even the most important public policy principle. Where the community is asked to endorse a course of action by granting medical and financial assistance, considerations of autonomy must give way to the broader notion of the public good, which gives primacy to the respect for life.

Advances in genetic and genomic research have introduced challenges in obtaining informed consent for research in low and middle-income settings. However, there are only few studies that have explored challenges in obtaining informed consent in genetic and genomic research in Africa and none in South Africa. To start filling this gap, we conducted an empirical study to investigate the efficacy of informed consent procedures for an H3Africa genomic study on Rheumatic Heart Disease at the University of Cape Town in South (...) Africa. The main aim of the study was to understand ethical challenges in obtaining informed consent in the RHDGen study. We used a qualitative study methodology involving in-depth interviews and participant observations. Our study participants were RHDGen cases, healthy controls and research staff involved in the recruitment of RHDGen cases and controls. In total, we conducted 32 in-depth interviews with RHDGen cases and controls, 2 in-depth interviews with research staff and 57 direct observations of the consent procedures of RHDGen cases and controls. The interviews were conducted in English, audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim. Data were analyzed using thematic content analysis. The study was conducted in 3 sites within Cape Town, South Africa. Most healthy controls joined the RHDGen study in order to be screened for rheumatic heart disease. A majority of RHDGen cases decided to join the RHDGen study because of therapeutic misconception. The ethical challenges that impacted on obtaining informed consent in the RHDGen study were complex. In this study, the main challenges were diagnostic misconception among RHDGen controls and therapeutic misconception among RHDGen cases. (shrink)

The first definitive edition in English of writings by poet, painter, pickpocket-plagiarist, and consummate anti-artist Francis Picabia, one of Dada's leading figures.

Land of Israel.—The Jordan and the Eastern Tribes.—The Northern Tribes.—The Central Tribes.—The Southern Tribes.—Mosaic Agriculturalism.—The Levites.—Polygamy.—The Neighbouring Nations.

In 1970, exactly fifty years ago, I took entrance examinations in Hebrew and Greek to begin studies at the Pontifical Biblical Institute, Rome. I have shared in various ministries since then, sometimes in positions that distracted from my academic interests. Nevertheless, I have been a privileged 'insider' to the development of critical studies of the New Testament over the past fifty years. Given my history, the title of this essay shamelessly plagiarises Geoffrey Blainey's delightful recollections of his early years, 'Before (...) I Forget'. (shrink)

David, king in Hebron.—Battle near Gibeon.—Murder of Abner.—Jerusalem.—State of Hebrew industry.—Conquest of Moab.—First war with the Zobahites.—Conquest of Edom.—Prosperity of David.—Ammonite war.—Destruction of the Ammonites.—Career of Absalom.—Death of Absalom.—Disgrace of Mephibosheth.—Immolation of Saul’s descendants.—The pestilence.—Conspiracy of Adonijah.—Death of David.

ABSTRACTWittgenstein’s remark that one cannot follow a rule only once has generated two puzzles: how can everyone accept it to be true? and why does Wittgenstein advance it? These two puzzles have tormented commentators for decades. In this paper I put forward a new interpretation and explain away the two puzzles. I shall show that Wittgenstein’s remark is plain truth and that his motivation behind making it is to dissolve the picture theory of meaning propounded in the Tractatus. This interpretation (...) also helps us to see that Wittgenstein’s other remark, that to follow a rule is a custom, is also a grammatical one. (shrink)

As a member of the BRAIN Neuroethics Subgroup, which drafted the Neuroethics Roadmap, I am proud of our work. The Roadmap is the result of many hours of thoughtful discussion, and reflects strong l...

In a sense, all technology is biotechnology: machines interacting with human organisms. Technology is designed to overcome the frailties and limitations of human beings in a state of nature -- to make us faster, stronger, longer-lived, smarter, happier. And all technology raises questions about its real contribution to human welfare: are our lives really better for the existence of the automobile, television, nuclear power? These questions are ethical and political, as well as medical; and they even reach to the philosophical (...) and spiritual. On the whole, we seem pretty well adapted to our technology, at least on the face of it -- but there have always been doubts about whether the human soul thrives best in the oppressively technological world we have created for ourselves. (I am continually struck by how much time I have to spend fixing the machines that supposedly improve my life.). (shrink)

Neuro-education, a new frontier for educational researchers, has its passionate advocates and equally passionate detractors. Some philosophers, including Noel Purdy and Hugh Morrison, Andrew Davis, and Ralph Schumacher, have argued that the entire enterprise is misguided. I evaluate and challenge their arguments. This permits me to articulate my own position: Neuroscience may make impressive contributions to education but, perhaps paradoxically, not by guiding the work of teachers.

In this essay I will consider two theses that are associated with Frege,and will investigate the extent to which Frege really believed them.Much of what I have to say will come as no surprise to scholars of thehistorical Frege. But Frege is not only a historical figure; he alsooccupies a site on the philosophical landscape that has allowed hisdoctrines to seep into the subconscious water table. And scholars in a widevariety of different scholarly establishments then sip from thesedoctrines. I believe (...) that some Frege-interested philosophers at various ofthese establishments might find my conclusions surprising.Some of these philosophical establishments have arisen from an educationalmilieu in which Frege is associated with some specific doctrine at theexpense of not even being aware of other milieux where other specificdoctrines are given sole prominence. The two theses which I will discussillustrate this point. Each of them is called Frege''s Principle, but byphilosophers from different milieux. By calling them milieux I do not want to convey the idea that they are each located at some specificsocio-politico-geographico-temporal location. Rather, it is a matter oftheir each being located at different places on the intellectuallandscape. For this reason one might (and I sometimes will) call them(interpretative) traditions. (shrink)

Strawson described ‘descriptive metaphysics’, Bach described ‘natural language metaphysics’, Sapir and Whorf describe, well, Sapir-Whorfianism. And there are other views concerning the relation between correct semantic analysis of linguistic phenomena and the “reality” that is supposed to be thereby described. I think some considerations from the analyses of the mass-count distinction can shed some light on that very dark topic.

This article identifies four approaches to arguing for democracy, showing that none has an adequate way of supporting both full adult inclusion and the exclusion of children. I focus in Section 2 on the arguments of David Estlund and Thomas Christiano, showing that their arguments against guardianship call into question the exclusion of children from the franchise. In Section 3, I explain why the exclusion of children constitutes an injustice, and in the final section, I consider two approaches to remedying (...) that injustice. Key Words: justice • democracy • children. (shrink)

Précédant le discours systématiquement développé qu'est la Logique de la philosophie, une substantielle introduction cherche dans une réflexion anthropologique la condition première et l'envoi le plus décisif de l'entreprise philosophante. Toujours pris dans la dualité essentielle de la raison et de la violence, l'homme s'appuie d'abord sur une sécurité communautaire idéalisée avant de chercher un recours dans des constructions ontologiques dont la fragilité objective ne pourra cependant pas résister à l'émergence d'une " condition " moderne vouée à l'épreuve de sa (...) finitude radicale. Prior to the systematically developed discourse which is the Logic of Philosophy, a substantial introduction seeks the first condition and the most decisive start of the undertaking of philosophy in an anthropological reflection. Being always caught in the essential duality of reason and violence, man first leans on an idealised communalistic security before having recourse to ontological constructions, the objective fragility of which, however, cannot resist the emergence of a modern " condition " destined for the test of its radical finiteness. (shrink)

Testing the validity of knowledge requires formal expression of that knowledge. Formality of an expression is defined as the invariance, under changes of context, of the expression's meaning, i.e. the distinction which the expression represents. This encompasses both mathematical formalism and operational determination. The main advantages of formal expression are storability, universal communicability, and testability. They provide a selective edge in the Darwinian competition between ideas. However, formality can never be complete, as the context cannot be eliminated. Primitive terms, observation (...) set-ups, and background conditions are inescapable parts of formal or operational definitions, that all refer to a context beyond the formal system. Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle and Gödel's Theorem provide special cases of this more universal limitation principle. Context-dependent expressions, on the other hand, have the benefit of being more flexible, intuitive and direct, and putting less strain on memory. It is concluded that formality is not an absolute property, but a context-dependent one: different people will apply different amounts of formality in different situations or for different purposes. Some recent computational and empirical studies of formality and contexts illustrate the emerging scientific investigation of this dependence. (shrink)

In this paper, I first review previous interpretations of Wittgenstein's remarks on private language, revealing their inadequacies, and then present my own interpretation. Basing mainly on Wittgenstein's notes for lectures on private sensations, I establish the following points: ‘remembering the connection right’ means ‘reidentifying sensation-types’; the reason for ‘no criterion of correctness’ is that nothing, especially no inner mechanisms nor external devices, can be utilised by the private speaker to tell whether some sensations are of one type or different types; (...) and private names are not really names, private language is not really a language, therefore, private language is a grammatical illusion. My interpretation has the advantage of being able to reconcile Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy, which is to dissolve philosophical problems by rearranging grammatical facts, with his actual philosophical practice, at least in the case of private language. (shrink)

We propose a generalization of expected utility that we call generalized EU (GEU), where a decision maker’s beliefs are represented by plausibility measures and the decision maker’s tastes are represented by general (i.e., not necessarily real-valued) utility functions. We show that every agent, “rational” or not, can be modeled as a GEU maximizer. We then show that we can customize GEU by selectively imposing just the constraints we want. In particular, we show how each of Savage’s postulates corresponds to constraints (...) on GEU. (shrink)

This study used the latent profile transition analysis to analyze whether emotional labor profiles change across time and how these profiles relate to occupational well-being (i.e., job satisfaction, quality of work life, psychological distress, and work–family conflict). A total of 155 full-time Chinese employees completed the questionnaire survey at two time points. Three latent profiles were identified at Time 1 and the same profiles were replicated at Time 2. We determined that the majority of the participants retained the original profiles. (...) Lastly, occupational well-being differed significantly across the identified profiles. The limitations and implications of this study were also provided. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Universal Salvation, Damnation, and the Task of TheologySimon Francis Gaine O.P.The science of theology is rightly concerned with questions of the ultimate salvation and damnation of intellectual creatures, both angelic and human.1 Here I shall touch on the orthodoxy and theological correctness of two opposed views, which are current in Christian theology today, about the ultimate fate of human beings in the order God has created. One is (...) universalism, the idea that all human beings definitely will or may be finally united with God in heaven.2 According to stronger or weaker versions of universalism, hell will or may be empty. The other is sometimes known as "infernalism," by which I mean the view that there will be some human beings forever separated from God, even if we do not know who they will be. According to infernalism, thus defined, hell will definitely not be empty.Hans Urs von Balthasar is among those theologians who is counted as a universalist. However, he distanced himself from the idea that universal salvation is something we can believe by faith or know for certain. Balthasar supposed that an empty hell is something we can instead hope for, and so [End Page 879] embraced a weaker version of universalism.3 Three short works by him have been gathered in English translation under the title Dare We Hope "That All Men Be Saved"?4 Among them is Balthasar's main defense of his position, Was dürfen wir hoffen?, which was first published in German in 1986.5 Though he acknowledges that we do not know for definite that universal salvation will take place, he treats it as something really possible. However, for "infernalists," as Balthasar dubs them, though we can certainly hope that any given individual will be admitted to heaven, we cannot hope for the salvation of the human race as a whole, because we are bound to believe that some will be lost, even though we may not know who they will be. This is because, on the infernalist account, the actual inhabitation of hell has been divinely revealed, such that universalism is outside the bounds of Christian orthodoxy, and so can hardly be true. From the first reactions to Balthasar's proposal, even before the publication of Was dürfen wir hoffen?, the revelation that some will be forever in hell has been presented as a refutation of Balthasar's hope, intimating that his universalism is heretical.6 Some critics have suggested that, while Balthasar was not setting out to oppose Church teaching, it is not possible to "accede to Balthasar's way of conceiving the possibility of eternal salvation and remain orthodox."7It seems to me, however, that both infernalism and a hope for universal salvation arguably lie within the current bounds of Catholic orthodoxy. I do not mean to say that both are correct. Evidently they cannot both be true. Either it is possible that hell will in fact be empty or it is not. Nevertheless, it seems to me that both views can be recognized as falling within the current bounds of orthodoxy. Consider how the claims of the classic Thomist and Molinist positions on the relationship between divine grace and human freedom cannot both be true in all their details, yet each falls within the [End Page 880] bounds of current Catholic orthodoxy and neither position can licitly call the other heretical, without prejudice to a future magisterial determination of the question.8 I suggest that, likewise, infernalism and universalism as understood by Balthasar both fall within the bounds of current Catholic orthodoxy, even if both cannot be correct. However, while the Catholic orthodoxy of infernalism, having been held within Catholicism over the centuries, is surely uncontested, that of universalism is strongly contested, especially on the alleged ground that infernalist teaching is revealed doctrine.Though universalism is certainly not a modern invention, it has become increasingly prominent in modern times. Since the Second Vatican Council, it has been embraced by a number of Catholic theologians.9 The extent of its contemporary support gives reason to ask whether it has become more or less positively recognized by the magisterium as an arguable theological... (shrink)

Propertius' account of this myth contains two major difficulties of syntax and interpretation: modo. When the word modo means ⋯ννοτε μ⋯νand stands in the first of two co-ordinate clauses it requires an answering modo or its equivalent in the second clause. Et and etiam are not satisfactory equivalents. So the necessary second modo—or equivalent—is here absent. ibat uidere is the sole account of Milanion's activities in connection with the hirsutae ferae. As such it appears obscure and abrupt.

Formation of a Religious Landscape: Shiʿi Higher Learning in Safavid Iran. By Maryam Moazzen. Islamic History and Civilization, vol. 151. Leiden: Brill, 2018. Pp. xiii + 290, illus. $149, €129.

In trying to make clear whether understanding is a mental state Wittgenstein asks a series of questions about the timing and duration of understanding. These questions are awkward, and they have posed a great challenge for commentators. In this paper I review the interpretations by Mole and by Baker and Hacker, and point out their problems. I then offer a new interpretation which shows (1) that a “mental state” in this context means a state of consciousness, (2) that Wittgenstein's questions (...) are intended to elicit the grammars of the words “understand” and a “state of consciousness”, (3) that, in this way, he clearly shows that understanding is not a state of consciousness and (4) that he also provides a therapy to dissolve the problem. (shrink)

Mathematics, even more than the other sciences, is often presented as essentially unique, as if it could not be any other way. And yet, prima facie alternative mathematics are all over the place, from non-Western mathematics to mathematics based on nonclassical logics. Taking inspiration from Robin Dembroff’s analysis of critical gender kinds, and from Andrew Aberdein and Stephen Read’s analysis of alternative logics, in this paper I will introduce a practice-centered framework for the study of alternative mathematics based on the (...) notion of critical math kind. After sketching a model of mainstream mathematics, I will provide examples of how deviation along several distinct dimensions can occur, and how deviations can vary in their gravity. I will then discuss how the framework can be used to think of questions concerning the alternativeness status and philosophical implications of alleged alternative mathematics, and help us in identifying alternatives that suit our purposes. (shrink)

Property rights of personal data have been advocated for some time. From the perspective of economics of law some argued that they could lower transaction costs for contracts involving personal data. This may be the case, but new transaction costs are introduced by propertization and the issue has not been settled. In this paper, I focus on a different and potentially more important aspect. In the actual situation, data collectors externalize costs and internalize benefits. An ownership regime that enables every (...) citizen to hold a personal data account, like a bank account, and that gives people ownership rights over secondary use of personal data could correct these misallocations. I hope to shed new light on the normative implications of the issue by offering normative justifications for property rights of personal data (Sections 2–4). Secondly, I present fundamental goals and building blocks of a property regime of personal data (Section 5) and, thirdly, I illustrate how income from personal data ownership could for instance contribute to financing pensions under proper regulation (Section 6). (shrink)